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Civil RICO: Should Private Plaintiffs Be
Granted Equitable Relief?

Few statutes have elicited more controversy than the Racketeer

Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO).' Central to this
controversy is the expansion of the scope of the civil RICO provi-

sions. 2 Apprehension stems in part from a recent explosion of civil
RICO actions. 3 RICO was enacted to eliminate the infiltration of
organized crime into legitimate business, 4 but is now frequently
utilized by private parties to supplement other forms of civil action

such as securities and antitrust claims.5 This expansive use of the
private civil RICO provisions probably was not intended by Congress
when RICO was enacted. 6 One of the issues generated by the RICO

controversy has centered around the availability of equitable relief.
The availability of equitable relief is an important question, since,

for example, a preliminary injunction may be the only way to prevent

1. RICO was enacted by Congress in 1970. Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (1970)
(codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982)).
2. See infra notes 4-5 and accompanying text.
3. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 105 S. Ct. 3275, 3277 n.1 (1985). "Of 270 district
RICO decisions prior to this year, only 3% (nine cases) were decided throughout the 1970s,
2% were decided in 1980, 7% in 1981, 13% in 1982, 33% in 1983, and 43% in 1984." Id.
4. Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 1, 84 Stat. 922-23 (1970).
It is the purpose of this Act to seek the eradication of organized crime in the United
States by strengthening the legal tools in the evidence-gathering process, by establishing new penal prohibitions, and by providing enhanced sanctions and new
remedies to deal with the unlawful activities of those engaged in organized crime.
Id.
5. See, e.g., Bennett v. Berg, 685 F.2d 1053 (8th Cir. 1982) (residents of retirement
community alleged the community was mismanaged); Dan River, Inc. v. Icahn, 701 F.2d 278
(4th Cir. 1983) (action to prohibit group attempting corporate takeover from exercising voting
rights); Miller v. Affiliated Fin. Corp., 600 F. Supp. 987 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (RICO claim filed
in case regarding misrepresentation before entering a limited partnership agreement devised by
defendants); USACO Coal Co. v. Carbomin Energy, Inc., 539 F. Supp. 807 (W.D. Ky. 1982),
aff'd, 689 F.2d 94 (6th Cir. 1982) (action to freeze assets of corporation that allegedly conspired
to defraud plaintiffs).
6. See infra notes 119-80 and accompanying text.
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destruction of an existing business by racketeering activities. 7 Although the Attorney General is authorized to obtain equitable remedies under civil RICO,' the language of section 1964(c) does not
clearly indicate whether similar relief is available to private parties. 9
Civil RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c), expressly authorizes a private cause
of action but provides merely for treble damages and is silent
regarding equitable remedies. 1° Section 1964(a) grants broad civil
remedies including divestiture, dissolution or reorganization, and
permanent injunctions" for violations of the substantive provisions
of 18 U.S.C. § 1962.12 Section 1962 imposes criminal sanctions for
receiving income from racketeering activity. 3 No specific section of
RICO grants to a private plaintiff the right to seek equitable remedies.
At the federal appellate level, only the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals has expressly declared injunctive 'elief unavailable to private
plaintiffs. 14 No other circuit court has directly addressed this issue.
Some circuits, however, have intimated that private equitable relief
would not be granted, 5 while others have suggested that such relief
would be available. 6

7. See infra notes 222-28 and accompanying text.
8. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(b) (1982).
9. Section 1964(c) provides: "Any person injured in his business or property.., may
sue therefor in any appropriate United States district court and shall recover threefold the
damages he sustains and the cost of the suit .... ." Id. § 1964(c) (1982).
10. The statute provides: "Any person ... may sue ... and shall recover threefold the

damages ....
Id.
11. Id. 1964(a) (1982).
12. Id. 1962 (1982).
13. Section 1961 defines racketeering activity as including "[ainy act or threat involving
murder, kidnaping, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, or dealing in narcotic or
other dangerous drugs, which is chargeable under State law and punishable by imprisonment
for more than one year." Id. § 1961 (1982). Also included in the definition are various sections
from title 18 of the United States Code. Id.
14. Religious Technology Center v. Wollersheim, 796 F.2d 1076, 1080-89 (9th Cir. 1986)
(denying injunction to halt dissemination of allegedly stolen church documents), cert. denied,
107 S. Ct. 1336 (1987).
15. Dan River, Inc. v. Icahn, 701 F.2d 278, 290 (4th Cir. 1983) ("There is substantial
doubt whether RICO grants private parties

. . .

a cause of action for equitable relief ...

[i]n

light of the most recent indications from the Supreme Court, Dan River's action for equitable
relief under RICO might well fail to state a claim"); Trane Co. v. O'Connor Sec., 718 F.2d
26, 28 (2d Cir. 1983) (citing cases that denied equitable relief and expressing similar doubts
regarding the propriety of private injunctive relief).
16. Bennett v. Berg, 685 F.2d 1053, 1064 (8th Cir.) (not deciding the issue but citing a
law review article indicating equitable relief available to private parties), aff'd on rehearing,
710 F.2d 1361 (8th Cir. 1982) (en banc), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1008 (1983); USACO Coal
Co. v. Carbomin Energy, Inc., 689 F.2d 94, 97-98 (6th Cir. 1982) (finding that the district
court had the power to issue a preliminary injunction). See also infra notes 186-91 and
accompanying text.
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The district courts that have confronted the equitable relief issue
display a similar conflict. 17 One district court has explicitly found
that private plaintiffs could obtain equitable relief,18 while three have
expressly declined to grant such relief. 19 Additionally, several district
courts have assumed that private civil RICO plaintiffs could obtain
equitable relief. 20
This comment will explore the controversy surrounding the issue
of granting equitable relief to private litigants pursuant to civil RICO.
The opinion of the ninth circuit in Religious Technology Center v.
Wollersheim2 will be closely examined.22 The express language of
section 1964 will first be scrutinized to determine whether private
equitable relief can be found in the language of the statute.2 Next,
the statute will be examined in light of the principles of statutory
construction to determine if such a remedy can be implied in a statute
not expressly authorizing private equitable relief. 24 This comment will
then review the legislative history surrounding the enactment of
RICO, including the analogies to section 4 of the Clayton Antitrust
Act which served as a model2s for the civil RICO statute.26 Finally,

the reasoning of the district courts concerning the grant or denial of
equitable relief to private plaintiffs, 27 as well as the policy consider-

17. See infra notes 192-221 and accompanying text.
18. Chambers Dev. Co. v. Browning-Ferris Indus., 590 F. Supp. 1528, 1541 (V.D. Pa.
1984) (holding private equitable relief available).
19. Miller v. Affiliated Fin. Corp., 600 F. Supp. 987, 994 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (denying private
plaintiffs request for injunction declaring a contractual agreement void); DeMent v. Abbott
Capital Corp., 589 F. Supp. 1378, 1382-83 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (denying mandatory injunction
ordering the defendants' divestiture); Kaushal v. State Bank of India, 556 F. Supp. 576, 58184 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (denying plaintiff's request to block sale of defendant's restaurant).
20. USACO Coal Co. v. Carbomin Energy, Inc., 539 F. Supp. 807, 814-16 (W.D. Ky.
1982) (granting a preliminary injunction freezing the defendant's assets without discussing
whether such relief was available to a private plaintiff), aff'd on other grounds, 689 F.2d 94
(6th Cir. 1982); Marshall Field & Co. v. Icahn, 537 F. Supp. 413, 420 (S.D.N.Y. 1982)
(preliminary injunction denied because plaintiff could not show a likelihood of success on the
merits); Vietnamese Fishermen's Ass'n v. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, 518 F. Supp. 993,
1014 (S.D. Tex. 1981) (preliminary injunction denied because plaintiff could not show a
likelihood of success on the merits).
21. 796 F.2d 1076 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1336 (1987).
22. See infra text accompanying notes 139-49 & 173-77.
23. See infra text accompanying notes 29-73.
24. See infra text accompanying notes 74-119.
25. See 116 CONG. Rac. 602 (1970) (remarks of Senator Hruska that civil provisions of
RICO utilize "time tested antitrust remedies"); id. at 35,295 (treble damages provision "another
example of the antitrust remedy being adapted for use against organized criminality"); Sedima,
S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 105 S. Ct. 3275, 3282 (1985) ("the clearest current in [RICO legislative
history] is the reliance on the Clayton Act model").
26. See infra text accompanying notes 120-80.
27. See infra text accompanying notes 181-221.
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ations surrounding the issue of private equitable relief will be discussed.n Initially, the express language of civil RICO must be explored
to determine whether the availability of private equitable relief can
be inferred from the statutory language.
THE ExPRss LANGUAGE oF RICO

Civil RICO has been criticized as having been drafted with more
"haste than wisdom.''29 The express language of the statute is therefore of little assistance in determining whether equitable relief is
obtainable by private parties. Nevertheless, the statutory language
must still be examined because the plain meaning of the language,
absent a clearly expressed legislative intent to the contrary, will
control. 0
The availability of equitable relief to private plaintiffs is subject
to varying statutory interpretations. Section 1964(a) expressly empowers the federal courts to grant formidable equitable remedies, but
does not specify who is entitled to this broad relief.3 Section 1964(b)
grants the Attorney General the power to institute proceedings3 2 and
also provides for the entry of "such restraining orders or prohibitions" as the court deems necessary. 33 Subsection (c) grants "any
person" a cause of action for a RICO violation but does not mention
private equitable remedies. 4 Since section 1964(c) fails to specify
whether private equitable relief is available, authorities have concluded that private plaintiffs may not seek equitable remedies. Other
commentators have urged that the express language of RICO vests

28. See infra text accompanying notes 222-38.
29. Bridges, Private RICO Litigation Based upon "Fraud in the Sale of Securities," 18
GA. L. REv. 43, 78-79 (1983). See also Adair v. Hunt Int'l Resources Corp., 526 F. Supp.

736, 746 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (section 1964(c) "not a model of legislative draftsmanship").
30.

United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580 (1981). "If the statutory language is

unambiguous, in the absence of a clearly expressed legislative intent to the contrary, that
language must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive." Id. (quoting Consumer Prod. Safety
Comm'n v. G.T.E. Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980).
31.

18 U.S.C. § 1964(a) (1982) provides for equitable remedies:

[i]ncluding but not limited to: ordering any person to divest himself of any interest,
direct or indirect, in any enterprise; imposing reasonable restrictions on the future

activities or investments of any person, ... prohibiting any person from engaging
in the same type of endeavor as the enterprise engaged in .... or ordering dissolution
or reorganization of any enterprise ....

Id.
32.
33.
34.

18 U.S.C. § 1964(b) (1982).
Id.
Id. 1964(c) (1982).

35. E.g., Religious Technology Center v. Wollersheim, 796 F.2d 1076, 1082-84 (9th Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1336 (1987); Bridges, supra note 29, at 81.
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the courts with authority to grant equitable relief to private parties. 36
Congress directed that the provisions of RICO shall be "liberally
construed to effectuate its remedial purposes. ' 3 7 This directive, known
as RICO's liberal construction clause, supports the argument that

equitable relief is available for private plaintiffs.

38

Commentators

suggest that this provision reflects the "clear" intention of Congress
that any ambiguity in the statute be resolved in favor of the victims

of the evil 9 Congress sought to eradicate by enacting RICO. 40 Ad-

ditionally, the Supreme Court recently directed that RICO be construed liberally "to effectuate its remedial purposes. ' 41 The remedial
purpose of RICO is to halt the infiltration of organized crime into

legitimate business. 42 Because the legislature mandated a liberal construction of the statute, private equitable relief arguably should be
inferred from the statutory language.
A.

Section 1964(a) as the Basis for Private Equitable Relief
Section 1964(a) of RICO may itself be sufficient to support private

equitable relief. 43 Subsection (a) provides that "[t]he district courts

of the United States shall have jurisdiction to prevent and restrain
violations of section 1962 of this chapter by issuing appropriate
orders, including, but not limited to: .... ."" This language suggests that
Congress did not intend to limit the inherent equity powers of the

36. See, e.g., Blakey & Gettings, Racketeer Influenced and CorruptOrganizations(RICO):
Basic Concepts-Criminaland Civil Remedies, 53 TEMP. L.Q. 1009, 1037-38 (1980); Blakey,
RICO Civil Action in Context: Reflections on Bennett v. Berg, 58 NoT-E DAmm L. REv. 237,
330-41 (1982-1983); Note, The Availability of Equitable Relief in Civil Causes of Action in
RICO, 59 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 945 (1984).
37. Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 947 (1970). See generally Note, RICO and the
Liberal Construction Clause, 66 CORNELL L. Rav. 167 (1980) (interpreting RICO's liberal
construction clause directive).
38. Note, supra note 37.
39. Congress enacted RICO to combat the "evil" of the infiltration of racketeering activity
into legitimate business. Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, 923 (1970).
40. Id. See also Note, supra note 36, at 949.
41. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 105 S. Ct. 3275, 3286 (1985) (quoting Pub. L. No.
91-452, 84 Stat. 947 (1970)). In Sedima, the court granted the corporation treble damages
under RICO for violations of the Act. This relief was based on predicate acts of mail and
wire fraud. The holding of the Court was reached by reading the RICO statute broadly. Id.
42. Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, 923 (1970).
43. See Fricano, Civil RICO: An Antitrust Plaintiff's Considerations, 52 ANTrrRUST L.J.
361, 375 (1983); Chambers Dev. Co. v. Browning-Ferris Indus., 590 F. Supp. 1528, 1540
(W.D. Pa. 1984). See also Religious Technology Center v. Wollersheim, 796 F.2d 1076, 108384 (9th Cir. 1986) (thorough discussion of this theory).
44. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a) (1982) (emphasis added).
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federal courts. 45 Moreover, section 1964(b) expressly authorizes the
Attorney General to "institute proceedings under this section ..."
and grants the court power to "enter such restraining orders or
prohibitions, ...

as it shall deem proper." Had Congress intended

that the availability of equitable relief under section 1964 was to be
determined solely by subsection (b), subsection (a) would46 be superfluous because both sections provide for equitable relief.
No court has allowed private parties to obtain equitable relief
based solely upon the statutory language.47 Courts that have granted
private equitable remedies have done so on the basis of the inherent
equitable powers of the federal courts. 48 Because Congress must speak
clearly to interfere with the historic equitable powers of the courts,49
the argument for granting equitable relief on this basis is strong.
The Supreme Court has stated, "absent the clearest command to the
contrary from Congress, federal courts retain their equitable power
to issue injunctions in suits over which they have jurisdiction." ' 0
The proposition that section 1964(a) of RICO is sufficient to
support private equitable remedies was argued by the plaintiff in
Religious Technology Center v. Wollersheim.51 In Wollersheim, the
Church of Scientology brought a civil RICO action seeking an order
to enjoin the defendants from allegedly passing copies of stolen
Church materials.52 The district court granted the Church a preliminary injunction which was reversed by the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit. 3 The Church argued that section 1964(a), which
provides for equitable remedies, invested the court with power to
grant equitable relief to private litigants because the section is general

45. Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 705 (1979) (federal courts possess inherent equity
power).

46. Statutes should not be construed so as to make part of the statute superfluous.
Carleson v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 64 Cal. App. 3d 145, 155-56, 134 Cal. Rptr.
278, 284 (1976).
47. See infra notes 181-221 and accompanying text.
48. Chambers Dev. Co. v. Browning-Ferris Indus., 590 F. Supp. 1528, 1540-41 (W.D.
Pa. 1984) (granted equitable relief on basis of inherent equitable powers and statutory
interpretation of § 1964(a) and (b)); Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Liebowitz, 570 F. Supp.

908, 910 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (granted injunction because the plaintiff met traditional standards
for obtaining a preliminary injunction in the circuit).
49. Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 705 (1979) (injunctive relief may be awarded in
a Social Security proceeding because no clear intent to override federal courts' power to issue

injunctions); see also Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395 (1946); Scripps-Howard
Radio, Inc., v. F.C.C., 316 U.S. 4, 9-11 (1942).
50. Califano, 442 U.S. at 705.
51. 796 F.2d 1076, 1083 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1336 (1987).
52. Id. at 1078-79.
53. Id. at 1091.
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and apparently unrestricted in application.5 4 The Church also argued
that, while the other subsections of 1964 grant specified relief to
specific parties, subsection (a) places no limit on the category of
litigants who might avail themselves of the remedies available under
RICO. 5 5 The Church asserted that subsection (b), which grants the
Attorney General the right to seek broad equitable remedies, does
not restrict injunctive relief to the Attorney General but instead sets
aside the traditional equity rule that only a victim can enjoin a
crime.5 6 In essence, the Church contended that part (a) was sufficient
authority for a federal court to grant an injunction to a private
RICO plaintiff even if subsection (c) had never been added to the
57
statute.
The court of appeals in Wollersheim rejected these arguments and
denied the injunctive relief sought by the plaintiffs stating that
58
equitable relief should not be implied from the statutory language.
The argument that section 1964(a) alone would allow private plaintiffs
an equitable remedy might be a reasonable interpretation of the
statutory language. 9 Yet, the Wollersheim court noted that congressional intent, as expressed in the legislative history of RICO, must
°
be examined to determine whether such a remedy was intended.
B. Analysis of the Language of Section 1964(c)
Because RICO authorizes a person whose business or property is
injured to "sue, ' 6' this wording may indicate that all necessary and
appropriate relief is available, absent statutory limitations.6 2 In addition, scholars defending a private equitable remedy have found
significant the fact that the treble damage provision in section 1964(c)

54. Id. at 1083.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 1083; see In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 582-84 (1895).
57. Religious Technology Center v. Wollersheim, 796 F.2d 1076, 1083-84 (9th Cir. 1986).
58. Id. at 1091.
59. Id. at 1084.
60. Id. See United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580 (1981) (must look to the legislative
history to determine if there is a strong legislative intent contrary to express language).
61. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) provides: "Any person injured in his business or property by
reason of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in any appropriate
United States district court and shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and the cost
of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee." Id. (emphasis added).
62. See Blakey & Gettings, supra note 36, at 1038 n.133; Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678,
684 (1946). "Where legal rights have been invaded, and a federal statute provides for a general
right to sue for such invasion, federal courts may use any available remedy to make good the
wrong done." Id.
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is preceded by "and" rather than "to.

' 63

Section 1964(c) in pertinent

part provides that "[a]ny person... may sue ... and shall recover
threefold the damges he sustains ....-"6 Because the word "and" is used

in the statutory language before the treble damages provision, some
scholars suggest that all appropriate relief, including the equitable
remedies of subsection (a), are available to private plaintiffs, rather
65
than treble damages alone.
Many courts and commentators have rejected the argument that
equitable relief is available to private parties merely because the word
"and" is used prior to the treble damages provision in section 1964(c)
instead of the word "to." 66 One court found such a reading "bizarre
and wholly unconvincing as a matter of plain English and the normal
use of language." 67 More recently, the Wollersheim court noted that
section 4 of the Clayton Act, 6 upon which RICO was modeled,
contains the same "and" before describing the remedy. 69 The Clayton
Act, although containing similar statutory language, does not extend
the remedy provision to encompass private equitable relief.70 As the
court in Wollersheim stated, the fact that the Clayton Act contained
the same language as RICO but did not grant private equitable
remedies "surely undermines the argument that [the word 'and'] in
section 1964(c) indicates ...

injunctive relief is not precluded by that

section." ' 71 Analysis of the language of RICO compels the conclusion
that civil RICO does not expressly provide for private equitable

63. See Blakey & Gettings, supra note 36, at 1038 n.133; Blakey, supra note 36, at 332.
But see Kaushal v. State Bank of India,,556 F. Supp. 576, 582 (N.D. II1. 1983) (discussing

Professor Blakey's interpretation of the word "and" in civil RICO and finding it unconvincing);
Religious Technology Center v. Woilersheim, 796 F.2d 1076, 1083 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied,

107 S.Ct. 1336 (1987) (discussing Professor Blakey's interpretation of the word "and" in civil
RICO and finding it unconvincing).
64. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982) (emphasis added).
65. Blakey & Gettings, supra note 36, at 1038 n.133.
66. See, e.g., Kaushal v. State Bank of India, 556 F. Supp. 576, 582 (N.D. I11.
1983);
Wollersheim, 796 F.2d at 1083; Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 741 F.2d 482, 489 n.20 (2d

Cir. 1984), rev'd on other grounds, 105 S.Ct. 3275 (1985) ("rather remarkable argument");
Bridges, supra note 29, at 76.
67. Kaushal, 556 F. Supp. at 582.

68.

15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (1976).

69.

Wollersheim, 796 F.2d at 1087 n.11. See also Kaushal, 556 F. Supp. at 582 (the

private antitrust remedy provided in § 4 of the Clayton Act contains the same "and shall
recover" language as RICO, and yet Congress had to expressly provide in another section for
equitable relief).

70. Minnesota v. Northern Sec. Co., 194 U.S. 48 (1904) (equitable relief was not available
to private parties under § 4 of the Clayton Act); see also Paine Lumber Co. v. Neal, 244

U.S. 459 (1917) (holding private equitable remedies not available under § 4 of the Clayton
Act).
71.
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relief. 72 The principles of statutory construction articulated by the
United States Supreme Court, therefore, must be employed to determine if equitable remedies may be inferred from the statutory language. 73
PRINCIPLES OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

Although civil RICO provides expressly for some private relief,
74
nothing in the statute expressly grants a private equitable remedy.
In Cort v. Ash, 75 the Supreme Court formulated four factors determinative of whether a private remedy should be implied when the
statute does not expressly provide one. 76 The Cort factors are relevant
to determine whether a remedy in addition to the provision 77for treble
damages can be inferred from the language of the statute.
A.

Availability of a PrivateRemedy: Cort v. Ash Factors

While RICO expressly grants some private relief in section 1964(c),
the Cort v. Ash factors are still relevant in determining whether
additional private remedies should be inferred. Courts have consistently applied the Cort v. Ash factors in RICO actions 7s and in cases
involving other statutes that provide some private relief, to determine
whether implying further remedies would be consistent with the
statutory scheme. 7 9 The four factors are: (1) Is the plaintiff one of
the class for whose special benefit the statute was enacted? 0 (2) Is
there any indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, to create
or deny such a remedy?8' (3) Is it consistent with the underlying
purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the

72. See supra notes 29-71 and accompanying text.
73. Wollersheim, 796 F.2d at 1087-88.
74. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982).
75. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
76. Id. at 78.
77. Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 575 (1979) (Cort factors relevant in
determining whether a private remedy is implicit in § 17(a) of the Securities and Exchange Act
of 1934 when such a remedy is not expressly provided for in the statute).
78. Kaushal v. State Bank of India, 556 F. Supp. 576, 584 (N.D. Ill. 1983); Religious
Technology Center v. Wollersheim, 796 F.2d 1076, 1088 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S.
Ct. 1336 (1987).
79. See, e.g., Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers, 453 U.S. 1
(1981) (applying the Cort v. Ash factors to determine whether additional private remedies can
be implied in the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1266 (1976 & Supp.
III 1979), and the Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act (MPRSA) 33 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1445
(1976 & Supp. III 1979).
80. Cort, 422 U.S. at 78.
81. Id.
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plaintiff? 82 (4) Is the cause of action one traditionally relegated to
state law in an area basically the concern of the states, so that it
would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action based solely on
federal law?8 A number of Supreme Court cases have applied the
Cort factors to interpret statutes similar to RICO. In all but one
case, 84 the statutes involved were somewhat different than RICO
because no private relief was provided for in the statute. However,
because the Supreme Court applied the Cort v. Ash factors in one
case involving a statute with some express private remedies,85 these
factors should be looked to for assistance in interpreting statutory
language.
Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington86 involved section 17(a) of the
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. Section 17(a) requires a brokerage firm to file financial reports with authorities from the Securities and Exchange Commission. The customers of a brokerage firm
brought suit for damages against the accountants who prepared an
audit to be used in connection with the required financial report.8
The customers alleged that misstatements were contained in the
reports.8 8 Section 17(a)89 imposed reporting requirements, but did not
provide an express cause of action for individuals injured by a
statutory violation90 The Supreme Court in Touche Ross emphasized
that the Cort factors were merely "relevant" factors and not entitled
to equal weight when determining whether private remedies should
be implied. 91 According to the Court, the "central inquiry" is whether
Congress intended to create a private cause of action either expressly
or by implication.9 2 The Court concluded that section 17(a) was
merely a reporting statute and Congress had not intended to create
a private right of action on behalf of brokerage firm customers. 9

82.
83.

Id.
Id.

84. Middlesex County Sewerage Ass'n v. National Sea Clammers, 453 U.S. 1 (1981).
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id.
442 U.S. 560 (1979).
Id. at 562.
Id.
15 U.S.C.A. § 78q(a) (West 1981). Section 17(a) of the 1934 Act requires a registered

securities brokerage firm to file an annual report of its financial condition. The report must
include a certificate by a public accountant which clearly states the opinion of the accountant
regarding the financial statement covered by the certificate. The accountant's statement also
must include a comprehensive statement as to the scope of the audit. Id.
90. Touche Ross, 442 U.S. at 578-79.
91. Id. at 575.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 579.
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Similarly, in TransamericaMortgage Advisors (TAMA) v. Lewis,9 4
the Supreme Court held that a private cause of action could not be
implied from the Investment Advisors Act of 1940. 9- In Transamerica,
a shareholder of Mortgage Trust of America brought suit for damages
alleging that trustees had been guilty of fraud and breach of fiduciary
duty in violation of the Investment Advisors Act of 1940.96 The
Court held that section 206 of the Act, which proscribes fraudulent97
practices of investment advisors, did not create or alter civil liability.
To grant the plaintiff the requested monetary relief, the Court would
have been required to read this relief into the act. 98 The Court
declined to do this. 99 Finally, in Middlesex County Sewerage Association v. National Sea Clammers,'°° the Supreme Court was confronted with the question of whether two federal environmental
statutes implied a private right of action.' 0 The Court concluded no
private relief was available, because Congress had expressly provided
for citizen's suits in other parts of the acts. 1 Additionally, congres03
sional intent to imply other private causes of action was absent.1
The issue involved in Sea Clammers is directly analogous to implying
a private equitable remedy pursuant to civil RICO. In Sea Clammers,
the environmental statutes had provisions for citizen's suits in other
sections of the acts.' °4 Similarly, section 1964(c) of RICO provides

94. 444 U.S. 11 (1979).
95. Id. at 20-21.
96. Id. at 13. The Investment Advisors Act of 1940 was enacted to deal with abuses that
Congress had found to exist in the investment advisers industry. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-i to 80b-19
(1982).
97. Transamerica, 444 U.S. at 19. Section 206 of the Investment Advisors Act is codified
at 15 U.S.C. § S0b(6).
98. Although monetary relief was sought by the plaintiff in this case, the fundamental
principles of statutory construction would be the same when equitable relief is sought. In
Transamerica, 444 U.S. at 14, the plaintiff sought injunctive relief in the district court and
no distinction was made between monetary relief and equitable relief for purposes of statutory
construction. Id.
99. Transamerica, at 19-20. The Court stated: "[I]t is an elemental canon of statutory
construction that where a statute expressly provides a particular remedy or remedies, a court
must be chary of reading others into it." Id.
100. 453 U.S. 1 (1981).
101. The case concerned the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA), 33 U.S.C.
§§ 1251-1266 (1976 & Supp. III 1979), and the Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries
Act (MPRSA), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1445 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
102. Sea Clammers, 453 U.S. at 14. Private actions are authorized for the FWPCA in 33
U.S.C. § 1365(a) (Supp. III 1979) and for the MPRSA in 33 U.S.C. § 1415(g) (Supp. III
1979).
103. Sea Clammers, 453 U.S. at 12. The Court stated: "In the absence of strong indicia
of a contrary Congressional intent, we are compelled to conclude that Congress provided

precisely the remedies it considered appropriate." Id. at 15.
104.

See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
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for some private relief but not equitable remedies. 05 The Court in
Sea Clammers found the fact that Congress had granted private
remedies in other sections of the acts persuasive in denying private
relief under a section not expressly providing such relief.I' 6
The Cort v. Ash analysis may be inappropriate in civil RICO
actions because the above cases' °7 are not all on point with respect
to civil RICO. 08 Touche Ross and Transamericaexamine the possible
existence of a private right of action implied from federal statutes
that are silent on the issue. 109 In contrast, Congress expressly established a private right of action for RICO but said little about the
remedies which are available for enforcement." 0 The distinction between RICO and the statutes at issue in the Cort v. Ash"' line of
cases has led one scholar to recognize that these cases may not control
in RICO actions. 112
The distinction between the Cort v. Ash line of cases and the
RICO statute has not been accepted by courts that have addressed
the issue of private equitable relief.113 Courts have, instead, generally
cited and applied Cort v. Ash and its progeny"4 in holding private
equitable relief unavailable under civil RICO.1' 5 In Wollersheim, the
court, relying on Sea Clammers,16 stated that when a statute has an
elaborate enforcement scheme conferring on both government officials and citizens authority to sue, the courts cannot assume that
Congress intended additional judicial remedies to be implied for
private citizens." 7 The absence of strong indicia of contrary legislative
intent compels the conclusion that Congress provided the appropriate

105. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982).
106. 453 U.S. at 14-15.
107. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560
(1979); Transamerica Mortgage Advisors (TAMA) v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979).
108. Wexler, Civil RICO Comes of Age: Some MaturationalProblems and Proposalsfor
Reform, 35 RuTGE.s L. R..
285, 319 (1983).
109. See supra notes 86-99 and accompanying text.
110. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982).
111. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
112. Wexler, supra note 108.
113. Religious Technology Center v. Wollersheim, 796 F.2d 1076, 1088 n.14 (9th Cir. 1986)

(applying the Cort factors and finding relief unavailable), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1336 (1987).
See also Kaushal v. State Bank of India, 556 F. Supp. 576, 584-85 (N.D. I11. 1983) (discussing
the Cort line of cases and finding no "strong indicia" of legislative intent to imply equitable
relief in RICO).
114. Wollersheim, 796 F.2d at 1088; Kaushal, 556 F. Supp. at 584-85.
115. Wollersheim, 796 F.2d at 1088; Kaushal, 556 F. Supp. at 584-85.
116. 453 U.S. 1 (1981).
117. Wollersheim, 796 F.2d at 1088 (citing Middlesex County Sewerage Ass'n v. National
Sea Clammers, 453 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1981)).
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remedies, ' 8 and private equitable relief is not available. Understanding congressional intent in the enactment of RICO requires examination of the legislative history of RICO." 9
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

Review of RICO legislative history demonstrates that Congress
never specifically focused on the issue of the availability of private
equitable relief. 20 Nevertheless, the legislative history should be reviewed to determine what Congress was attempting to remedy by
enacting an antiracketeering statute. The congressional purpose can
be helpful in determining what remedies Congress believed appropriate.
A.

The Birth of RICO

In 1969 Senators McClellan and Hruska introduced the precursor
of RICO, the Corrupt Organizations Act.' 21 As introduced, the bill
did not expressly grant private remedies,' " but provided only criminal
sanctions and governmental equitable relief. 2 3 The Senate Committee
on the Judiciary incorporated the bill into the Organized Crime
Control Act as Title IX.124 No private cause of action had yet been
added to Title IX.
The provision for a private right of action in RICO originated in
the House of Representatives. The House Committee on the Judiciary
amended the bill to include private remedies after holding hearings

118.

Id.

119. Train v. Colorado Pub. Interest Research Group, Inc., 426 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1976) (when
the legislative history would aid in construing the language of the statute, it can be examined).
120. Wexler, supra note 108, at 315. See also infra notes 121-53 and accompanying text.
121. S. 1861, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 115 CONG. REc. 9566-71 (1969).
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 926-28 (1970)
(codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 6001-6005 (1976)); S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 83 (1969).
The report from the Senate Judiciary called for:
New approaches that [dealt] not only with individuals, but also with the economic
base through which those individuals constituie[d] a serious threat to the economic
well being of the nation, including a civil law approach of equitable relief broad
enough to do all that is necessary to free the channels of commerce from all illicit
activity.
Id. at 76-79 (1969). Senator McClellan's Judiciary Committee report also commented on what
is now § 1964, but which at that time contained only subsections (a) and (b). The report noted
that § 1964 contained broad remedial provisions for reform. Id. "Although certain remedies
are set out, the list is not exhaustive, the only limit on remedies is that they accomplish the
aim set out of removing the corrupting influence and make due provision for the rights of
innocent persons." Id.
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in response to a proposal by the American Bar Association.'2 During
hearings on the bill, Representative Steiger offered an amendment

proposing the addition of a private treble damages action modeled
on the antitrust laws. 126 This amendment also explicitly provided a

private injunctive remedy.127 There was little discussion of the treble
damages provision. The legislative history is silent as to precisely

why Representative Steiger withdrew the amendment authorizing a
private remedy and the subcommittee chose instead to expressly
2
provide for only the private treble damages relief. 1

Commentators have reached differing conclusions after reviewing
the legislative history of RICO. Some scholars have found that the

legislative history indicates Congress intended private plaintiffs to
receive broad equitable remedies. 2 9 Other authors have viewed the
same excerpts of history as indicative of legislative intent to preclude

such relief. 30
The legislative history may be interpreted to allow private equitable

remedies by inferring that Representative Steiger withdrew his amendment to RICO because the original bill already contemplated private

125. 116 CONG. REc. 35,295 (1970) (statement of Representative Poff). When the amended
bill was in the house, Edward L. Wright, President-elect of the American Bar Association,
testified before the House on Senate Bill 30 and suggested a treble damages remedy be added
to the bill. "In the portion seeking to add a proposed section 1964 'civil remedies' we would
recommend an amendment to include the additional civil remedy of authorizing private damage
suits based on the concept of § 4 of the Clayton Act." 116 CONG. REc. 25,190-91 (1970). See
also Blakey, supra note 36, at 275.
126. See 116 CONG. REc. 35,346 (1970).
127. Senator Hruska's original RICO bill, S. 2049, 113 CONo. Rac. 17,999 (1967), also
provided for private equitable relief. Representative Steiger withdrew his amendment in response
to remarks by Representative Poff:
I want to pay special tribute to the gentleman in the well for having raised the issue
which his amendment defines. It does offer an additionalcivil remedy which I think
properly might be suited to the special mechanism fashioned in Title IX. Indeed, I
am an author of an almost identical amendment. It has its counterpart almost in
haec verba in the antitrust statutes, and yet I suggest to the gentleman that prudence
vwould dictate that the Judiciary Committee very carefully explore the potential
consequences that this new remedy might have in all the ramifications which this
legislation contains and for that reason, I would hope that the gentleman might
agree to....
withdraw his amendments....
116 CONG. Rac. 35,346 (1970). The House then passed the bill with the treble damages
provision, and the Senate concurred with the House version of the RICO bill. Id. at
36,296.
128. See 116 CoNG. REc. 25,190-91 (1970). The reason for little discussion regarding the
type of relief available under civil RICO is probably because of the late introduction of the
bill, after completion of the Senate hearings and after six of eight days of House hearings,
Bridges, supra note 29, at 54 n.83.
129. Blakey & Gettings, supra note 36, at 1038; Blakey, supra note 36, at 331-38; Wexler,
supra note 108, at 315-22.
130. E.g., Bridges, supra note 29, at 74-77.
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equitable relief and thus made an amendment unnecessary. 131 While

this proposition finds some support in the legislative history, the
evidence is not conclusive.

32

When Representative Steiger first intro-

duced his amendment to create a private right of action, he stated
that Title IX did not authorize private equitable relief. Later in
debate Representative Steiger noted that he felt "presumptuous" for
suggesting that private relief was not available under Title IX.133 He

added that innocent victims may be able to "obtain proper redress"
under the bill without his amendment. 34 These statements by Representative Steiger do not conclusively demonstrate that he believed

the original bill contained equitable remedies.
Another argument in favor of interpreting the legislative history

to provide for private equitable relief can be made by reading the
treble damages remedy in section 1964(c) as an addition to the
equitable remedies provision of section 1964(a).1 35 To some extent,

the legislative history does support this theory. 136 During House
debate, Representative Poff, the House sponsor of the original Or-

ganized Crime Control Act,13 7 introduced the bill:
Courts are given broad powers under the title [IX] to proceed
civilly, using essentially their equitable powers, to reform corrupted
organizations, for example by prohibiting the racketeers to participate any longer in the enterprise, [by ordering divestitures and even
by ordering dissolution or reorganization of the enterprise] . 13 In
addition, at the suggestion of [Mr. Steiger] the committee has

131. See, e.g., Blakey, supra note 36, at 279 n.121.
132. See Blakey & Gettings, supra note 36, at 1097. The authors stated that "even though
[Representative Steiger] later withdrew the amendment, he made it clear that he felt the
authorization for the private injunctive action existed in the bill and that the amendment was
merely to clarify the procedure." Id. However, the language actually used by Representative
Steiger in withdrawing his amendment does not evidence that Representative Steiger "clearly"
felt authorization for private equitable relief already existed. See Blakey, supra note 36, at
279 n.121. Blakey's interpretations should be given some credence since he was the chief
counsel of the Senate Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the United States
Senate in 1969-1970, when the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 was processed. Kaushal
v. State Bank of India, 556 F. Supp. 576, 582 n.17 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
133. 116 CONG. REc. 35,346-47 (1970).
134. Id. at 35,346.
135. Blakey, supra note 36, at 332; Note, supra note 36, at 948. But see Religious
Technology Center v. Wollersheim, 796 F.2d 1076, 1085 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S.
Ct. 1336 (1987).
136. See infra notes 137-40 and accompanying text.
137. Wollersheim, 796 F.2d at 1084 (citing S. 30, 91st Cong. 1st Sess., 115 CONG. REc.
769 (1969)). Senate Bill 30 was the Organized Crime Control Act which was amended to
incorporate Senate Bill 1861 as Title IX.
138. Divestitures and dissolutions are expressly provided for in 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a) (1982).
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provided that private persons injured by reason of a violation of
the title may recover treble damages in federal courts. 3 9
Since he stated that treble damages were allowed in addition to the
equitable remedies of subsection 1964(a), Representative Poff arguably believed private parties could receive the remedies specified in
1964(a).140 The arguments against private equitable relief based upon
the legislative history are, however, equally potent.
Two episodes from the legislative history of civil RICO convinced
the Wollersheim court that Congress did not intend to grant equitable
relief to private parties . 14 This finding was based upon the same
legislative history as discussed above but the court drew the opposite
conclusion. The first episode was the proposed amendment by Representative Steiger. 142 After the withdrawal of the amendment by
Representative Steiger, the bill was passed with the treble damages
providing what seems to be the sole private remedy.143
The second incident occurred after the enactment of RICO. In
1971, Congress rejected a bill to amend section 1964, which would
have provided for private equitable relief.' 44 The proposed bill was
characterized as an expansion of the currently available civil remedies
since "[n]ow only the United States can institute injunctive proceedings.' 1 45 Although the amendment was made after RICO was enacted
and therefore is postlegislative history and not conclusive, the amendment cannot merely be ignored.146 The report from the Senate Judiciary on the proposed bill, was favorable. 147 The committee noted
that the new bill "authoriz[ed] private injunctive relief from racket-

139. 116 CONG. RIc. 35,295 (1970) (emphasis added), See also Wollersheim, 796 F.2d at
1085.
140. Wollersheim, 796 F.2d at 1085 (quoting 116 CONG. Rac. 35,295 (1970)) (stating that
the record provides some support for the thesis that the private treble damages remedy is
additional to equitable RICO remedies).
141. Id. at 1085.
142. See 116 CONG. REC. 35,346 (1970); see also supra notes 126-34 and accompanying
text.
143. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982).
144. S. 16, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. (1971) (during the Senate term following the enactment
of RICO, the amendment offered by Representative Steiger, which was later withdrawn, was
proposed as a bill to amend § 1964).
145. Victims of Crime, Hearing before the Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and Procedures
of the Senate Comm. of the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1972).
146. Wollersheim, 796 F.2d at 1086 n.10. In North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S.
512, 530-35 (1982), the Supreme Court used the postenactment history of Title IX to assist in
determining the intended scope of the title.
147. S. REP. No. 1070, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1972); see also 118 CoNG. REc. 29,370
(1972).
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eering activity.' 1 48 The bill was then passed by the Senate but was
not approved by the House.

49

An analysis of excerpts from the legislative history of RICO reveals
that Congress did not intend equitable relief to be available to private
litigants in civil RICO actions. In fact, Congress specifically rejected

various amendments and bills that would have expressly granted
private plaintiffs the right to injunctive relief.150

Express statutory language controls interpretation of a statute in

5
the absence of a "strong indicia of contrary legislative intent."' '

Logically, therefore, equitable relief is not available to a private
plaintiff since the legislative history does not strongly show congres52
sional intent to the contrary. As expressed in the legislative history,

however, civil RICO was modeled after analogous provisions in the
antitrust laws. Since the language of section 1964(c) follows section

4 of the Clayton Act 53 nearly verbatim, an examination of the
similarities and differences between the antitrust remedy and civil

RICO may be helpful in determining the availability of private
equitable relief.
B. Analogies to Antitrust
The legislative history of RICO evinces a strong congressional
intent to model civil RICO after the Clayton Act. The antitrust laws

served as a model for the civil RICO provisions. 54 When the language
of section 15 of the Clayton Act and subsections 1964(a) and (b) of
civil RICO are compared, no material difference can be ascertained. 55

148. S. RaP. No. 1070, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1972).
149. Wollersheim, 796 F.2d at 1086.
150. H.R. 321, 326, 726, 760, 2697, 5215, 9327, 9710 & 10077, 91st Cong., 1st Sess.
(1969); S. 2048 & 2049, 90th Cong., ?,dSess. (1968).
151. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580 (1981).
152. See supra notes 120-50 and accompanying text.
153. The Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976) is an antitrust provision.
154. Religious Technology Center v. Wollersheim, 796 F.2d 1076, 1086 (citing 116 CONG.
Rc. 592 (1970) (remarks of Senator McClellan)); id. at 602 (remarks of Sen. Hruska) (civil
provisions in RICO employ "time tested antitrust remedies"); S. Rap. No. 617, 80-82, 125,
160 (1969), reprintedin 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADhuN. NEWS 4007; 116 CONG. REc. 35,295
(1970) (provision for treble damages is "another example of the antitrust remedy being adapted
for use against organized criminality"); Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 105 S. Ct. 3275, 3282
(1985) ("The clearest current in [legislative] history is the reliance on the Clayton Act model
155. 15 U.S.C. § 4 (1976) provides:
The several district courts of the United States are invested with jurisdiction to
prevent and restrain violations of sections 1-7 of this title; and it shall be the duty
of the several United States attorneys, in their respective districts, under the direction
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Additionally, the private treble damages remedy embodied in section

1964(c) of civil RICO follows the language of section 4 of the Clayton
Act almost verbatim.1 5 6 Nevertheless, the analogy between the Clayton
Act and civil RICO is incomplete. Injunctive relief is expressly

provided for in section 16 of the Clayton Act,'17 while civil RICO
has no analogous provision. Congress added section 16 to the Clayton
Act in response to Supreme Court opinions finding private equitable
relief unavailable under sections 4 and 15 of the Act. 5 8 Since Congress
knew from prior experience with the Clayton Act'5 9 that equitable
remedies would not be inferred, equitable relief should have been
expressly provided for in RICO. Yet in civil RICO the legislature
chose language nearly identical to sections 4 and 15 of the Clayton
Act, which had been interpreted by the Supreme Court not to

encompass equitable relief. 60
Although civil RICO and antitrust provisions are closely analogous,

the analogy is not necessarily compelling. Three basic arguments support rejection of the analogy drawn between civil RICO and the antitrust
provisions. First, the antitrust laws differ in structure from RICO.' 6' Next,
the legislative history of section 16 of the Clayton Act is different than
the history surrounding RICO.6 2 Finally, the Clayton Act and civil RICO
63
are substantively dissimilar.'
The structure of civil RICO differs from the antitrust provisions.
The Clayton Act grants jurisdiction to district courts and gives the

of the Attorney General, to institute proceedings in equity to prevent and restrain
such violations. Such proceedings may be by way of petition setting forth the case
and praying that such violations shall be enjoined or otherwise prohibited. When
the parties complained of shall have been duly notified of such petition the court
shall proceed, as soon as may be, to the hearing and determination of the case; and
pending such petition and before final decree, the court may at any time make such
temporary restraining order or prohibition as shall be deemed just in the premises.

Id.
156. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982) (RICO) with 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976) (Clayton
Act).
157. 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1976). In pertinent part, § 16 provides that "[a]ny person, firm,
corporation, or association shall be entitled to sue for and have injunctive relief .. . ." Id.
158. Minnesota v. Northern Sec. Co., 194 U.S. 48, 70-71 (1904) (because Congress
prescribed a specific equitable remedy that the Attorney General could seek, that is the only
equitable remedy Congress intended); see also Paine Lumber Co. v. Neal, 244 U.S. 459, 471
(1917) (a private citizen cannot maintain a suit for an injunction under § 4 of the Clayton
Act).
159. Minnesota, 194 U.S. at 70-71; PaineLumber Co., 244 U.S. at 471.
160. Minnesota, 194 U.S. at 70-71; Paine Lumber Co., 244 U.S. at 471.
161. See infra notes 164-68 and accompanying text.
162. See infra notes 169-72 and accompanying text.
163. See infra notes 173-77 and accompanying text.
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Attorney General power to institute equity proceedings.

164

Separate

sections of the antitrust law provide private parties with treble
damages and injunctive remedies. 65 In contrast, RICO has a single
subsection granting jurisdiction to the courts to grant equitable
relief. 166 That subsection is not expressly limited to injunctive actions
brought by the Attorney General. 67 Because of this difference in
structure, Congress may have believed that a separate section specif68
ically for private plaintiffs was unnecessary.
The comparison between RICO and the antitrust laws has been
criticized for overlooking the legislative history of section 16 of the
Clayton Act. 69 In Paine Lumber Co. v. Neal, 70 the Court held that
a private person could not maintain a suit under section 4 of the
Clayton Act. 71' However, the dissent noted that prior to the enactment
of the Clayton Act, the decisions of the lower courts differed
1 72
regarding the availability of private equitable relief.
In Church of Scientology v. Wollersheim 7 1 the Church argued that
the comparisons between civil RICO and the Clayton Act were
inappropriate. 74 The Church reasoned that because the Clayton Act
includes a provision expressly limiting the availability of injunctive
relief to the government, 17 - and RICO contains no such provision,
RICO and the Clayton Act are not truly similar.176 The court in
Wollersheim refuted this contention by holding that whether or not

164. 15 U.S.C. § 4 (1976).
165. Id. §§ 15, 26 (1976).
166. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a) (1982).
167. Id.
168. Wexler, supra note 108, at 317.
169. Fricano, supra note 43, at 376.
170. 244 U.S. 459 (1917).
171. Id. at 464.
172. Id. at 474-76 (dissenting opinion). The dissenting justices found it insignificant that
an express statement granting private injunctive relief was omitted from the Sherman Act.
Instead the dissent found authority for private injunctive relief in article III, § 2 of the United
States Constitution which, in effect, adopted equitable remedies in all cases consisting of a
federal question. Id. at 474-76. Section 2 of Article III extends the judicial power to "[a]ll
cases in lav and equity, arising under this Constitution, [and] the laws of the United States
..... " Id. (citing U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 2). See Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946). "[W]here
legal rights have been invaded, and a federal statute provides for a general right to sue for
such invasion, federal courts may use any available remedy to make good the wrong done."
Id. at 684. But see Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 565 (1979); Transamerica
Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 13 (1979); supra notes 74-119 and accompanying
text (demonstrating that current Supreme Court jurisprudence limits implying federal remedies).
173. 796 F.2d 1076 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1336 (1987).
174. Id. at 1087 n.13.
175. 15 U.S.C. § 25 (1976).
176. Wollersheim, 796 F.2d at 1087 n.13.
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the Clayton Act and RICO are truly similar, Congress believed them
to be at the time of the passage of RICO. 177 Congress, therefore,

could have added a provision for private equitable relief and clearly
chose not to do so.

Congress knew sections 4 and 15 of the Clayton Act had not been
interpreted to allow private parties equitable relief. 78 Had Congress
intended private RICO plaintiffs to receive equitable remedies, Congress knew from experience 7 9 that this right would have to be

expressly delineated. 80 Since Congress chose not to expressly provide
for private equitable relief, this relief should not be implied from
the legislative history.
DISTRICT AND CIRCUIT COURTS'

OPINIONS

Opinions of the district and circuit courts reflect a disunity of

views regarding the availability of private equitable relief under civil
RICO.' " Most courts interpreting RICO look to the express language
of the statute, the legislative history surrounding the enactment of

RICO, and the analogy between civil RICO and the Clayton Act. 18 2
In contrast, some court opinions employ little analysis in determining

whether private equitable relief is available.' Still other courts have
simply assumed the availability of equitable remedies. 8 4 The court

177. Id.
178. Minnesota v. Northern Sec. Co., 194 U.S. 48, 70-71 (1904) (because Congress
prescribed a specific equitable remedy that the Attorney General could seek, that is the only
equitable remedy Congress intended); Paine Lumber v. Neal, 244 U.S. 459 (1917) (a private
citizen cannot maintain a suit for an injunction under § 4 of the Clayton Act).
179. Congress enacted § 16 of the Clayton Act to provide private equitable remedies in
part because of the decisions of the Supreme Court in Northern Sec. Co., 194 U.S. 48 (1904)
and Paine Lumber, 244 U.S. 459 (1917), which denied the existence of an implied private
equitable remedy.
180. See supra text accompanying notes 158-60.
181. See infra notes 185-221 and accompanying text.
182. See, e.g., Religious Technology Center v. Wollersheim, 796 F.2d 1076, 1088 (9th Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 17 S. Ct. 1336 (1987). Kaushal v. State Bank of India, 556 F. Supp. 576,
585 (N.D. IUl. 1983) (both holding private equitable relief unavailable).
183. See, e.g., Chambers Dev. Co. v. Browning-Ferris Indus., 590 F. Supp. 1528, 1541
(W.D. Pa. 1984); Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Liebowitz, 570 F. Supp. 908, 911 (E.D.N.Y.
1983) (both holding private equitable relief available).
184. See, e.g., USACO Coal Co. v. Carbomin Energy, Inc., 539 F. Supp. 807, 814-15
(W.D. Ky.) (issuing a preliminary injunction freezing defendant's assets), aff'd, 689 F.2d 94
(6th Cir. 1982); Marshall Field & Co. v. Icahn, 537 F. Supp. 413, 420-22 (S.D.N.Y. 1982)
(preliminary injunction denied because plaintiff could not show a likelihood of success on the
merits); Vietnamese Fishermen's Ass'n v. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, 518 F. Supp. 993,
1014-15 (S.D. Tex. 1981) (preliminary injunction denied because plaintiff could not show a
likelihood of success on the merits).
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opinions should be examined in detail to determine which analysis
appropriately interprets civil RICO.
A.

The Opinions of the FederalAppellate Courts

In Religious Technology Center v. Wollersheim,185 the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals denied the plaintiff's request for a preliminary
injunction. The injunction was requested to stop the defendants from
disseminating documents allegedly stolen from the Church. While
this court is the first federal appellate court to expressly decide
whether equitable relief is available to private parties,'16 a few other
courts have recognized the issue and reserved judgment on the matter.
The fourth circuit in Dan River, Inc. v. Icahn, s7 implied that
injunctive relief would not be available to a private plaintiff but did
not decide the issue.188 Similarly, in Trane Co. v. O'Connor,'s9 the
second circuit expressed doubts as to the propriety of injunctive relief
for private parties. 90 In contrast, the eighth circuit has hinted that
injunctive relief may be available under either civil RICO or under
the general equitable powers of a court. 91 This disunity of views,
while primarily dicta, suggests that when the circuit courts do finally
decide the issue, there will be a split among the circuits similar to
that in the district courts.
B.

The Analysis of the District Courts

Two district courts have expressly held equitable relief available to
private plaintiffs under civil RICO. 192 In Aetna Casualty & Surety
Co. v. Liebowitz193 the court granted a preliminary injunction to the

185. Religious Technology Center v. Wollersheim, 796 F.2d 1076 (9th Cir. 1986),
cert.
denied, 107 S. Ct. 1336 (1987).
186. Id.at 1081.
187. 701 F.2d 278 (4th Cir. 1983).
188. Id. at 290. The court stated that: "while we do not undertake to resolve
question,
[i]n light of the most recent indications from the Supreme Court, Dan River'stheaction
for
equitable relief under RICO might well fail to state a claim." Id.
189. 718 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1983).
190. Id. at 28. "[Courts which have confronted the issue have expressed serious
concerning the propriety of granting injunctive relief under any circumstances to private doubt
parties
alleging securities violations under RICO." Id.
191. Bennett v. Berg, 685 F.2d 1053, 1064 (8th Cir. 1982) (without endorsing the
explicitly, the court cited Blakey & Gettings, supra note 36, at 1014, 1038 nn.132-33, view
a law
review article which advocates granting private equitable relief).
192. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Liebowitz, 570 F. Supp. 908, 911 (E.D.N.Y.
1983);
Chambers Dev. Co. v. Browning-Ferris Indus., 590 F. Supp. 1528, 1541 (W.D. Pa.
1984).
193. 570 F. Supp. 908 (E.D.N.Y. 1983).
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plaintiff after finding that Aetna had met the traditional prerequisites
194 The court first looked to
for obtaining a preliminary injunction.
the express language of the statute and concluded that only the
195
Attorney General could seek equitable relief. The court then noted
that section 1964(a) gives courts broad jurisdiction to remedy RICO
97
violations,'196 "by issuing appropriate orders."' The court found that
nothing in the statute indicates a preliminary injunction is an inappropriate order. 98 The court in Aetna mentioned that Congress turned
away earlier versions of RICO containing provisions for private
equitable relief. 9 9 Nonetheless, the court found no clear indication
"traditional
of congressional intent to deprive the district court of
200
equity jurisdiction" to grant a preliminary injunction.
The district court in Chambers Development Co. v. BrowningFerris Industries2° 1 allowed a private plaintiff to seek equitable relief
under section 1964(c). Concluding that private equitable relief was
available, the court noted the other district court opinions that had
202 The court, however, found these cases
reached contrary results.
unpersuasive and instead focused upon RICO's liberal construction
in
clause. 203 Additionally, the court found support for its conclusion
2 °4
relief.
equitable
grant
to
the inherent power of a federal court
Three district courts have assumed the availability of private equitable remedies.205 In Vietnamese Fishermen'sAssociation v. Knights
of the Ku Klux Klan, the district court refused to grant a preliminary
injunction under civil RICO because the plaintiffs could not show a
substantial likelihood of success on the merits of a RICO cause of
action.2 6 The court did not even mention that private injunctive
relief may not be available. Similarly, the court in Marshall Field &
Co. v.Icahn20 7 denied a preliminary injunction under RICO because
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.

199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.

Id. at 910.
Id.
Id. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1982).
Id. § 1964(a).
Aetna, 570 F. Supp. at 910.

Id. See also supra notes 121-50 and accompanying text (legislative history of RICO).
Aetna, 570 F. Supp. at 910.
590 F. Supp. 1528 (W.D. Pa. 1984).
Id. at 1540.
Id.
Id. at 1540-41.

205. Vietnamese Fishermen's Ass'n v. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, 518 F. Supp. 993

(S.D. Tex. 1981); Marshall Field & Co. v. Icahn, 537 F. Supp. 413 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); USACO
Coal Co. v. Carbomin Energy, Inc., 539 F. Supp. 807 (,V.D. Ky. 1982), aff'd on other
grounds, 689 F.2d 94 (6th Cir. 1982).
206. 518 F. Supp. 993, 1014 (S.D. Tex. 1981).
207. 537 F. Supp. 413 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
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the plaintiffs could not show a substantial likelihood of success on
the merits. 2 8 This district court also made no mention of the argument that preliminary injunctive relief may not be available to private
plaintiffs. Finally, in USACO Coal Co. v. Carbomin Energy, Inc.,209
the court entered a temporary injunction freezing the defendant's
assets, without discussing the propriety of private equitable relief
under civil RICO.2 10 Presumably, the district courts which assumed
the availability of private equitable remedies felt that the federal
courts retained their inherent power to grant these remedies and that
discussing the propriety of equitable relief in civil RICO actions was
unnecessary.
Only three decisions from the district courts interpret civil RICO
as denying private equitable relief.211 Of the three opinions, only
Kaushal v. State Bank of India212 merits extended analysis because
the later opinions follow its analysis very closely. 2 3 In Kaushal, the
court examined the express language of civil RICO to determine if
equitable relief was available.2 14 The court reviewed the argument 21 5
that "and" before the treble damages clause in civil RICO, instead
of "to," meant the treble damages relief was in addition to the
equitable remedies of section 1964(a) .2 16 The court dismissed this
argument as a "bizarre and wholly unconvincing" manipulation of
the English language.
Next, the court searched the legislative history to determine the
congressional intent in enacting RICO. The court emphasized the
withdrawal of Representative Steiger's amendment allowing private
injunctive relief as evidence that Congress did not intent to make
such relief available to private plaintiffs. 217 In addition, the court
stressed the analogy between the Clayton Act and civil RICO, noting

208. Id. at 420 (the court also stated that Field had not demonstrated irreparable harm
from the Icahn group's share acquisition).
209. 539 F. Supp. 807 (W.D. Ky. 1982), aff'd on other grounds, 689 F.2d 94 (6th Cir.

1982).
210. Id. at 814-15.
211. Kaushal v. State Bank of India, 556 F. Supp. 576 (N.D. Ill. 1983); DeMent v. Abbott
Capital Corp., 589 F. Supp. 1378 (N.D. Ill. 1984); Miller v. Affiliated Fin. Corp., 600 F.
Supp. 987 (N.D. Ill. 1984).
1983).
212. 556 F. Supp. 576 (N.D. Ill.
213. In DeMent, the court expressly followed Judge Shadur's opinion in Kaushal. DeMent,
589 F. Supp. at 1381-83. In Miller, the court held equitable relief unavailable to private
plaintiffs by citing Kaushal. Miller, 600 F. Supp. at 994.
214. Kaushal, 556 F. Supp at 581.
215. See supra notes 63-72 and accompanying text (further discussion of this argument).
216. Kaushal, 556 F. Supp. at 582.
217. Id. at 583.
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that a separate private remedy was later added to the Clayton Act
to ensure private plaintiffs injunctive relief. 218 This apparently convinced the court that Congress understood that a private equitable
remedy would have to be expressly delineated to be granted.
Finally, the court applied the canons of statutory construction set
forth by the Supreme Court in the Cort v. Ash 19 line of cases. Since
the court could not find strong indicia of legislative intent to grant
equitable relief, the court determined that a private plaintiff could
not recover equitable relief under civil RICO. 220 None of the district
or circuit courts discussed the policy considerations underlying the
grant or denial of private equitable relief. As the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals noted in Wollersheim, substantial policy issues are pertinent to the decision to grant or deny equitable relief. 221
POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

Compelling policy reasons favor granting private equitable relief
pursuant to civil RICO. In enacting RICO, Congress intended to
curtail and perhaps eliminate the debilitating effect of racketeering
activity on American society. 2m There is no doubt that the granting
of a private equitable remedy would promote a public-private partnership in the enforcement of RICO.2 3 Although the Attorney Gen-

eral has the express statutory authority to bring an action for
equitable relief, the resources of the prosecuting authority are very
limited.2 4 The Attorney General may not want to bring a civil RICO
action solely for equitable relief unless the injunction would halt an

activity causing drastic harm to society, 5 By promoting a privatepublic partnership in enforcing RICO, presumably fewer "racketeers"

would be successful in their attempts to destroy legitimate businesses
because their unlawful activities could be stopped before any permanent damage is done to the victim's business.? 6 Additionally, the
victim of illegal racketeering activity has the most incentive to stop

218. Id.
219. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
220. Kaushal, 556 F. Supp. at 584.
221. Religious Technology Center v. Wollersheim, 796 F.2d 1076, 1088-89 (9th Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1336 (1987).
222. Note, supra note 37, at 167-69 (discussing the liberal construction clause and the

purpose for the enactment of RICO).
223.

224.

Wexler supra note 108, at 321.

Wexler, supra note 108, at 321.

225.

Id.

226.

See id.
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the wrongdoing. 227 If private parties can only sue for damages, then
a private party victimized by racketeering activity may have difficulty
business could
ending the victimization. The injury to the plaintiff's
228
continue throughout the trial for treble damages.
Important considerations are implicated in the decision to grant
private equitable relief. RICO actions can be brought against people
who are neither racketeers nor members of organized crime.22 1 An
allegation of racketeering may have a debilitating effect upon a
legitimate business. 2 0 An alleged RICO violation confronts the
defendant with the specter of a quasi-criminal allegation which could
stigmatize as racketeers those individuals 23 ' who are typical defendants
in security and antitrust litigation. 2 2 Most recent civil RICO litigation
involves corporate defendants and their advisors. The mere pendency
of a RICO suit against a defendant creates a stigma which could
affect the reputation, business, and personal life of a defendant. 233
Courts have criticized the growing number of cases which improperly exploit the vague language of the civil provisions of the federal
racketeering statute.2 4 While the denial of private equitable relief
may not decrease the number of civil RICO actions brought, a
limitation on civil RICO may discourage potential plaintiffs from
arguing to further expand the already broad provisions of civil
RICO.23s

Furthermore, the courts are not empowered to determine what
Congress should have done, but can only interpret and apply the
law the legislature has enacted. 236 Presumably Congress recognized
the social benefits that would inure if private equitable relief was
allowed. Whether Congress would have been wiser in granting private
equitable relief is irrelevant. The relevant inquiry is whether Congress

227. Id. at 324-25.
228. Id.
229. Note, Liability for GeneralBusiness Fraud: Putting a Contract Out on RICO Treble
Damages, 45 U. Prrr. L. REv. 481, 493 (1983) (discussing the adverse impact of civil RICO
on individuals that were arguably not intended to be covered by RICO's provisions).
230. Id.
231. Such as investment advisors, accountants, lawyers, and executives of publicly held
corporations.
232. Batista, The Uses and Misuses of RICO in Civil Litigation:A Guide for Plaintiffs
and Defendants, 8 DEL. J. Cons. L. 181, 182 (1983).
233. Id. at 191.
234. See, e.g., Mauriber v. Shearson/A-Export, Inc., 546 F. Supp. 391 (S.D.N.Y. 1982)
(criticizes misuse of RICO as an attempt to recoup investment losses).
235. 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (1982).
236. Religious Technology Center v. Wollersheim, 796 F.2d 1076, 1088-89 (9th Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1336 (1987).
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intended to grant equitable relief to private parties, not whether this
37
relief should be granted.2

CONCLUSION

Civil RICO contains no express language granting private equitable
relief. The authority to grant permanent equitable relief should not
be inferred from the statutory language due to the restrictive view
currently held by the Supreme Court regarding implied federal causes
of action. In addition, because the legislative history of RICO does
not evince a strong intent to include private equitable remedies, these
remedies should not be read into the statute.
While the federal courts retain their equitable power to issue
injunctions in cases in which they have jurisdiction, 218 section 1964(a)
should be limited in application to preliminary injunctions which
would preserve the status quo pending litigation on the merits. 23 9
This grant of equity jurisdiction should not, however, be extended
to grant a private right to permanent equitable relief such as divestiture or reorganization of an enterprise.

Kristi Rae Culver

237.
238.
239.
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